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In an optimum currency area (Mundell 1961) efficiency is maximized if the area shares 
a single currency.  One rationale behind the creation of the euro, for instance, is that the 
individual countries of Europe do not each form an optimum currency area but Europe 
as a whole does.  Even if the fundamental economic variables determining real 
exchange rates are nonstationary (Da Silva 2002) and accordingly the rates are 
nonstationary, the fundamentals can still be sufficiently integrated as in a currency area.  
Here the real rates will share common trends (Enders and Hurn 1994).  The existence of 
at least one cointegration vector in a set of national economies’ nonstationary series 
suggests both an optimum currency area and generalized purchasing power parity (G-
PPP).  One purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether Mercosur (the South American 
trade group) is an optimum currency area in that sense.  
The idea of G-PPP was pioneered by Enders and Hurn (1994), who apply it to 
Pacific Rim countries.  G-PPP was rejected and the Pacific Rim nations were found not 
to constitute an optimum currency area.  Enders and Hurn (1997) also tested G-PPP to 
the G7 countries.  They found one cointegration vector at the 5 percent significance 
level, which means that those countries’ real exchange rates seem to be linked by a 
single long run equilibrium relationship, and a shock to any one rate is likely to affect 
the long run values of the others.  Liang (1999) found that G-PPP holds for China, Hong 
Kong, Japan, and the United States, and then that those countries constitute an optimum 
currency area.  Bernstein (2000) tested G-PPP for the euro area and found that the null 
of noncointegration cannot be rejected.  Lee (2003) found that Australia, New Zealand, 
and Japan comprise an optimum currency area, but this is not true of Australia, New 
Zealand, and the USA.  And the East Asia countries were found not to constitute an 
optimum currency area (Choudhry 2005, Ahn et al. 2006, Kawasaki and Ogawa 2006). 
  Previous work on Mercosur roughly suggests that it is still a mirage.  Hallwood 
et al. (2006) examined the case for either Latin American monetary union (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela) or monetary union with the USA through 
official dollarization.  Using VAR techniques they found that macroeconomic shocks 
are so highly asymmetric in Latin America and between the Latin American countries 
and the USA as to make monetary union or official dollarization questionable.  We will 
replicate this finding below.  It contrasts with Fratianni (2004) and Alexander and Von 
Furstenberg (2000), who argued that the Mercosur members are suited to creating a 
common currency (though not to adopting the US dollar).  Of course, one cannot 
neglect the hypothesis that an optimum currency area may be endogenous (Frankel and 
Rose 1998) in the sense that there can be a positive association between trade intensity 
and business cycle correlation.  But empirical evidence suggests that this is unlikely for 
Mercosur (Hallwood et al. 2006, Ahumada and Martirena-Mantel 2001, Licandro-
Ferrando 2000).  Intraregional trade in Mercosur is still modest, thanks mainly to the 
low openness of the Argentine and Brazilian economies (Machinea 2004).  The 
Brazilian economy can be considered more relatively diversified than Argentina’s 
(Barenboim 2004) and, as a result, less prone to large asymmetries of shocks (Kenen 
1969, Calderon et al. 2007).  But increasing intra-Mercosur trade is unlikely to make it 
more suitable for monetary union because the macroeconomic shocks between the 
countries and between them and the USA do not become more symmetric as time goes 
by (Hallwood et al. 2006).  This contrasts with the experience of the European countries 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1994). 
  The issue of the usefulness of monetary union for the Mercosur countries has 
also been addressed in a number of other papers (e.g. Busse et al. 2006, Camarero et al.  
 
2006, Berg et al. 2002, Hochreiter et al. 2002, Corbo 2001, Salvatore 2001), but usage 
of the G-PPP approach is novel.  Our contribution in this paper is thus to show that 
although a necessary condition for Mercosur to be an optimum currency area is met, 
there are still large cross-country differences as to cast doubt on the success of either 
monetary union or official dollarization.  Here we abstain from any discussion of the 
policy implications of our findings, and confine ourselves to make our case in a rather 
technical way.  However, our results can still be contextualized in the debate by 
considering the above references. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents data.  Section 3 




We considered quarterly data from 1973Q3 to 2006Q3 for the Mercosur’s full members 
(Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA), Paraguay (PAR), Uruguay (URU)), the applicant 
Venezuela (VEN) as well as the USA, considered as the benchmark country.  We also 
used data for Bolivia (BOL) and Chile (CHI) in the stationarity tests.  The series of 
consumer price index (CPI) and average dollar price of the currencies were taken from 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  Yet our results could be replicated for 
wholesale price indices rather than CPIs (available upon request). 
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country i at time period t,  , it e  is the natural log of the nominal exchange rate in country 
i,  , it p  is country i’s natural log of the CPI, and 
*
t p  is the natural log of the US CPI.  
Figure 1 displays the real exchange rates.  A first look suggests that the Mercosur rates 




Table 1 presents results of the unit roots tests of Dickey-Pantula (DP) (1987), 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock 
(ERS) (1996).  The DP tests suggested that the series do not present two or more unit 
roots.  The ERS tests are more appropriate for slow adjustment processes, and thus were 
performed for the cases where the autoregressive parameter in the ADF tests fell above 
0.9.  The ADF and PP tests suggested rejection of the null of unit root for Bolivia and 
Chile at the significance level of one percent.  However, the tests did not provide 
evidence of rejection (at one percent) of the null for the Mercosur countries.  Thus 
Bolivia and Chile could be left out from the subsequent cointegration analysis. 
Because the series present structural breaks, we also performed Lee-Strazicich 
(2003, 2004) minimum Lagrange multiplier unit root tests, which allow for one and two 
endogenous breaks under both the null and alternative hypotheses.  The series’ volatility 
made it hard for us to tell whether the breaks occurred in either intercept or trend.  So 
we considered two cases, namely (1) a crash model where the breaks occur in the 
intercept, and (2) a trend model with breaks in both intercept and trend.  Apart from 
Bolivia (one percent significant), the tests did not reject the null (Table 2), thus 
confirming those in Table 1.  We also performed Zivot-Andrews (1992) and Perron 
(1997) unit root tests with one endogenous break and the result of nonstationarity 
appeared again (output available upon request).  The break dates identified in the Lee-
Strazicich tests (Table 2) captured the breaks related to both the oil shock of 1979 and  
 
the financial crises of the eighties.  Yet we further considered in the cointegration 
analysis the changes occurred in the countries’ monetary regimes (as in Singh et al. 
2005) (Table 3).  And an oil shock dummy was also inserted to track the short run 
dynamics. 
Then we carried out the cointegration analysis allowing for two breaks in the 
long run relationship (as in Johansen et al. 2000).  We also considered the traditional 
Johansen (1988, 1991) full information maximum likelihood approach without breaks.  
Here, the likelihood ratio test statistics were adjusted by the Cheung-Lai (1993) 
correction term.  We performed the cointegration tests through two types of model, 
namely (1) a restricted deterministic linear trend (RDLT) model, and (2) a deterministic 
linear trend (DLT) model.  The RDLT model takes only one intercept (or none) in the 
deterministic linear trend, and the DLT model considers both intercept and trend.  Table 
4 shows the results of the bivariate cointegration analysis.  We rejected the null of 
noncointegration for Argentina-Uruguay (at one percent), Brazil-Paraguay and 
Paraguay-Venezuela (at 5 percent), and for Argentina-Venezuela and Paraguay-
Uruguay (at 10 percent).  Overall the cointegration vector parameters  s β  were 
significant.  In particular, for Argentina-Uruguay and Paraguay-Uruguay the sum of the 
s β  were not significantly different from zero.  This at first suggests leaving the USA 
out from the potential currency area (see Enders and Hurn 1994). 
  However, the cointegration vector parameter reflects not only the trade relation 
but also broader fundamental macro variables tracking the linkages between the 
countries, such as technology transfers, immigration, and financial resource movements 
(Enders and Hurn 1994).  The more similar the aggregate demand parameters, the 
smaller the cointegration vector parameter.  Tables 5–9 show that all the cointegration 
vector parameters fell above 0.8 in absolute value (see also Figures 2–6).  This means 
that the countries are very dissimilar, regardless of whether a long run relationship 
exists.  The  s α  in the tables are the adjustment speed parameters from the short run to 
the long run.  The significant absolute values were lesser than 0.21, which means large 
deviation persistence.  It is necessary from 1.2 to 4 years for the short run deviations to 
damp out.  This finding is consistent with the ‘PPP puzzle’, i.e. high short run real 
exchange rate volatility accompanied by slow adjustment process toward the long run 
path.  Whenever the  s α  were nonsignificant (meaning ‘weak exogeneity’), we also 
performed extra Granger-causality tests to check for ‘strong exogeneity’, which means 
that the other country in a relation does not affect the country with the nonsignificant 
adjustment coefficient.  The null of strong exogeneity could not be rejected at one 
percent in the bivariate relations. 
By first considering ‘core’ Mercosur (without Venezuela), we could reject the 
null of noncointegration at one percent (Table 10 and Figure 7).  The  s β  were all 
significant at one percent, and their sum was not nil (10 percent significant).  This 
means that the USA cannot be excluded from the potential currency area.  The core 
Mercosur countries depended on the US fundamentals.  Moreover, the aggregate 
demand parameters revealed cross-country dissimilarities.  In particular, the coefficients 
of adjustment speed for Brazil were nonsignificant, and the null of strong exogeneity 
could not be rejected.  For Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay the α -persistence ranged 
from 1.3 to 3.7 years. 
The null of noncointegration could also be rejected for ‘full’ Mercosur 
(including Venezuela).  Table 11 shows the estimates of the cointegration vector and the 
adjustment coefficients (see also Figure 8).  The  s β  were all significant and their sum 
was not nil (5 percent significant).  This replicated the former finding that the USA  
 
cannot be excluded from the potential currency area.  Also, the  s β  all fell above 0.5 in 
absolute value, thus reinforcing the finding of cross-country dissimilarities.  The 
estimates of the adjustment speed parameter also presented the PPP puzzle.  And 
Argentina and Venezuela were found to be strongly exogenous to the other Mercosur 
partners.  In short, G-PPP held for Mercosur and then a necessary condition for an 
optimum currency area was met.  Yet we cannot push this result too far and conclude 
that Mercosur is ready for either a single currency or official dollarization because we 




Mercosur’s real exchange rates were found nonstationary, and this allowed us to assess 
whether G-PPP holds through a cointegration analysis.  Our findings suggested that the 
null of noncointegration could be rejected for Mercosur.  But one cannot jump to the 
conclusion that it constitutes an optimum currency area because the cointegration vector 
estimates pointed to large cross-country dissimilarities.  We also found that Mercosur 
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Figure 1. Real exchange rates against the US dollar, 1973Q3−2006Q3 
 
 














Figure 3. Cointegration relation in the 
RDLT: Argentina and Venezuela 
Figure 2. Cointegration relation in the 
DLT model: Argentina and Uruguay 
  
 




















Figure 4. Cointegration relation in the 
RDLT model: Brazil and Paraguay 
Figure 5. Cointegration relation in the DLT 
model: Paraguay and Uruguay 
Figure 6. Cointegration relation in the DLT 
model: Paraguay and Venezuela 
Figure 7. Cointegration relation in the 
DLT model: core Mercosur 
Figure 8. Cointegration relation in the 
DLT model: full Mercosur  
 
Table 1. Unit root tests 
Country Series  with  DP  ADF  PP  ERS 
Intercept  −10.539*  −2.392  −2.646***  −1.446  ARG 
Deterministic Linear Trend  −10.539*  −2.380  −2.639  −2.121 
Intercept  −10.452*  −0.705  −3.263**  −0.576  BOL 
Deterministic Linear Trend  −10.452*  −3.295***  −4.934*  − 
Intercept  − 8.753*  −1.484  −1.415  −0.170  BRA 
Deterministic Linear Trend  − 8.753*  −1.869  −1.672  −1.951 
Intercept  −4.809*  −5.081*  −4.589*  −0.716  CHI 
Deterministic Linear Trend  −4.809*  −4.836*  −4.235*  − 
Intercept  −8.490*  −0.975  −1.076  −0.816  PAR 
Deterministic Linear Trend  −8.490*  −2.763  −2.798  −1.867 
Intercept  −10.305*  −1.742  −2.144  −1.591  URU 
Deterministic Linear Trend  −10.305*  −1.754  −2.154  −1.656 
Intercept  −9.803*  −2.224  −1.600  −2.240**  VEN 
Deterministic Linear Trend  −9.803*  −2.244  −1.480  −2.280 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10% 
 
Table 2. Lee-Strazicich unit root tests 
Country  Series with model of  Break Date 1  Break Date 2  t-statistic 
Crash 1982Q2*  1990Q1**  −2.808
NS  ARG 
Trend Break  1990Q1*  2002Q1**  −4.306
NS 
Crash 1985Q1*  −  −1.688
NS  BOL 
Trend Break  1983Q1*  1986Q4*  −6.970* 
Crash 1979Q4**  2002Q2*  −3.090
NS  BRA 
Trend Break  1984Q3
NS 1998Q3*  −4.018
NS 
Crash 1982Q2*  1999Q4***  −0.592
NS  CHI 
Trend Break  1985Q3*  1999Q2***  −4.373
NS 
Crash 1986Q4*  −  −2.438
NS  PAR 
Trend Break  1983Q3*  1986Q3**  −4.035
NS 
Crash 1982Q3*  2002Q2*  −3.332
NS  URU 
Trend Break  1985Q2
NS 2000Q4*  −4.512
NS 
Crash 1986Q4*  1999Q3***  −2.857
NS  VEN 
Trend Break  1989Q3*  −  −4.516*** 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%, 
NS nonsignificant 
 
Table 3. Monetary regime changes 
Country  Break Date 1  Break Date 2 
ARG 1991Q2 2001Q4 
BRA 1994Q3  1998Q4 
PAR 1989Q2  2001Q4 
URU  1990Q4 2001Q4 
VEN 1989Q2  2002Q1 
            
Table 4. Bivariate cointegration analysis 
 ARG  BRA  PAR  URU 
BRA  λtrace  0      
PAR  λtrace  0  1** (no break)     
URU  λtrace  1* (breaks)  0  1*** (breaks)   
VEN  λtrace  1*** (no breaks)  0  1** (breaks)  0 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10% 
  
 
Table 5. Cointegration vector for Argentina 
and Uruguay (breaks at 1990Q4 and 2001Q4) 
Deterministic Linear Trend Model 
C0 = 3.024*  T0 = −0.002
NS 
C1 = 0.246
NS  T1 = 0.000
NS 




i α   i β  
ARG  −0.210*  1.000* 
URU  0.158*  −1.224* 
Total  −0.224
NS 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 10%, 
NS nonsignificant 
 
Table 6. Cointegration vector for Argentina 
and Venezuela 
Restricted Deterministic Linear Trend Model 
Country 
i α   i β  
ARG  −0.094*  1.000* 
VEN  −0.002
NS 
(1)  1.367** 
Total 2.367* 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 10%, 
NS nonsignificant 
(1) The hypothesis that ARG does not Granger-cause VEN 
could not be rejected at 1% 
 
Table 7.  Cointegration vector for Brazil 
and Paraguay 
Restricted Deterministic Linear Trend Model 
Country 




PAR  0.062*  −1.404* 
Total  −0.404*** 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 10%, 
NS nonsignificant 
 (1) The hypothesis that PAR does not Granger-cause BRA 
could not be rejected at 1% 
 
Table 8. Cointegration vector for Paraguay 
and Uruguay (breaks at 1989Q2 and 2001Q4) 
Deterministic Linear Trend Model 
C0 = −5.128* T0  =  −0.001
NS 
C1 = 0.907**  T1 = −0.015* 




i α   i β  
PAR  −0.179*  1.000* 
URU  0.059
NS (1)  −0.868* 
Total 0.132
NS 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 10%, 
NS nonsignificant 
(1) The hypothesis that PAR does not Granger 
-cause URU could not be rejected at 1%  
 
Table 9.  Cointegration vector for Paraguay 
and Venezuela (breaks at 1989Q2 and 2001Q4) 
Deterministic Linear Trend Model 
C0 = 5.995*  T0 = 0.003
NS 
C1 = 3.846*  T1 = −0.037* 
C2 = −1.583
NS  T2 = 0.014
NS 
Country 
i α   i β  
PAR  −0.033
NS (1)  1.000* 
VEN  0.110*  −2.138* 
Total  −1.138* 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 10%, 
NS nonsignificant 
(1) The hypothesis that PAR does not Granger 
-cause VEN could not be rejected at 1% 
 
Table 10. Cointegration vector for core 
Mercosur (breaks at 1990Q4 and 1998Q4) 
Deterministic Linear Trend Model 
C0 = 1.306
NS  T0 = −0.013* 
C1 = 0.291**   
C2 = −0.100
NS   
Country 
i α   i β  
ARG  −0.193*  1.000* 
BRA  −0.017
NS  0.578* 
PAR  −0.068**  0.466* 
URU  0.164*  −1.722* 
Total  0.322*** 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 10%, 
NS nonsignificant 
The hypothesis that ARG, PAR, and URU do not 
Granger-cause BRA could not be rejected at 1% 
 
Table 11. Cointegration vector for full 
Mercosur (breaks at 1994Q3 and 2002Q1) 
Deterministic Linear Trend Model 
C0 = 1.457
NS  T0 = −0.012** 
C1 = −7.284*  T1 = 0.073* 
C2 = 9.490*  T2 = −0.076* 
Country 
i α   i β  
ARG  −0.060
NS  1.000* 
BRA 0.070* 0.549*** 
PAR 0.059*  −1.853* 
URU  0.108*  −1.371* 
VEN  −0.023
NS  2.570* 
Total  0.895** 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 10%, 
NS nonsignificant 
The hypotheses that BRA, PAR, URU, and VEN 
do not Granger-cause ARG, and that ARG, BRA, 
PAR, and URU do not Granger-cause VEN could 
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